This paper models the behavior of states in a federal country wising to attract foreign firms to locate within their own individual jurisdictions. The essential intertemporal character of this decision is modeled as a multi-stage game to attract such foreign investment in these states. It is found that, when states with unequal political or economic infrastructure compete, the resulting Nash equilibrium profiles are inefficient. Under certain conditions, states that have won once, can "allow" a rival to win in a subsequent stage. The resulting Nash Equilibrium is more efficient. If the option of "allowing" a rival to win is not available, then states may resort to "suicide" strategies defined as outcomes created by history of losses.
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I. Introduction
Competition between sub-national governments in matters of tax and public expenditure has been an issue of major concern in public economics for long.
Reflecting an early concern Gordon (1983) examined whether tax competition and public expenditure competition among sub-national units (henceforth states) that may not be overly concerned over the spillover effects of such competition across their respective geographic boundaries, have often been associated with the emergence of sub-optimal national outcomes.
While the above analysis concentrates on domestic issues clearly competition among states extends to offering concessions for attracting international investment -both portfolio and foreign direct investment (FDI) . A concern of the early literature on this issue was whether there should be policy co-ordination across states when it comes to offering such concessions or, whether states should be given a free hand to pursue policies to attract firms. Thus, Kanbur and Keen (1993) and Wildasin (1989) argue that interstate tax coordination rather than tax competition is welfare optimal. This is because tax competition to attract new firms could reduce to what Sinn (1994) calls "benefit taxation". However Brennan and Buchanan (1980) argue that tax competition is in fact "constitutionally efficient".
Another strand of the literature has explicitly incorporated the effects of business climate into models of inter-state competition for firms (Edwards and Keen, 1996 , and Ellis and Rogers, 1999 , and Venkatesan and Varma, 2000 . Much of this analysis is conducted as a single stage prisoner's game.
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Whereas much of this literature has focused on competition for portfolio investment others have emphasized the need to distinguish between capital and firm mobility. Doyle and Wijnbergen (1984) and Bond and Samuelson (1986) have examined the location choice of a specific profit-making firm. King and Welling (1992) , King, 3 McAfee and Welling (1993) , and, Besley and Seabright (1999) model competition between governments in a dynamic environment.
Equally important is the literature that assesses the impact of competition among states for foreign direct investment (FDI). 3 States compete by offering tax concessions and other incentives to prospective investors. Such competition often resembles an arms race and is difficult to stop once started. 4 A state competes because of, i) a perceived increase in the welfare of its residents consequent upon the decision of firms to locate within its geographical area, and, ii) political expediency caused by the government's need to retain power beyond a specific time period.
5
Recent literature has interpreted states' incentives for attracting firms more broadly to include all types of incentives for firms to locate within their boundaries and called it "competitive bidding" or simply "bidding" for FDI. Most of this literature underscores the deleterious effects of such bidding on sub-national and, hence, aggregate welfare.
Thus, Nov (2006) argues that bidding for FDI by countries (not just states) represents a sub-optimal global solution and suggests that a global mechanism should be devised to ensure that FDI is allocated efficiently. In particular, he seeks an expanded role for the World Trade Organization (WTO) in regulating and overseeing FDI. This is the so-called WTO+ solution. Even more relevant for the case of a country like India Kessing et. al. (2009) show that the existence of vertical fiscal inefficiencies prevents federal countries from successfully bidding for FDI. In particular, if these countries also have weak institutions their ability to attract FDI is lower in comparison to unitary countries.
In the present paper we examine the behavior of states within a federal framework where, competition between states takes place in order to attract investments from outside this system (i.e., country). Firms are offered inducements by competing states 3 See for example, Hwang and Choe (1996) , Yang (1996) , Haufler (1998) , Janeba (1998 ), and, Lorz (1998 . Wilson (1999) is a recent survey of the literature. 4 See Grady (1987) , and, Jenn and Nourzad (1996) . 5 A related literature examines inter-jurisdictional (inter-state) competition in and analyses the welfare implications of such competition. Such welfare implications include extraction of surplus from incoming firms (Olsen and Osmundsen, 2000 , and maximizing the revenue for the centralized authority (Keene and Kotsogiannis, 2003, and Cardarelli and Taugourdean, 2002). 4 in the form of tax concessions and other incentives, all of which involve costs. A higher level of tax incentive offered to incoming firms in addition to possibly attracting these firms, provide a significant political advantage at home. This fact is then endogenous to the payoffs. Competition between states is then modelled as a stage game of three stages which corresponds to the planning period (in years) of elected governments.
The paper discusses the case where there is a series of investing firms that are homogeneous in every respect. The paper also examines the consequences of competition between states with different measures of political advantage derived from offering these incentives.
Our point of departure (and hence contribution) is twofold. The first is to capture the reputation effects of the states' offers over time and the consequence of competing for investing firms based partly on considerations of reputation building. Secondly, we explicitly recognize that the FDI decision process is an intertemporal one. The "stage game" envisaged in the extant literature is actually a two-stage game with state governments deciding to bid in the first stage and the firms reacting in the second. The game ends at this point. In our model, however, the firm's decision to locate is treated as exogenous. The states bid within a planning horizon. Hence there can be repeated winners -indicating the intertemporal nature of the process. This is a deviation from and a substantial generalization of the extant models.
In this paper we prove the following results: a) All the Nash equilibria (N.E.) that result as an outcome of competition between states with unequal political or economic infrastructure will be inefficient. b) Under certain conditions states that have won once, can "allow" a rival to win in a subsequent stage. The resulting Nash equilibrium will be a more efficient equilibrium. (This is a possibility only if all states involved resort to such a strategy). c) If the option of "allowing" a rival to win is not available, then states may resort to "suicide strategies" in order to overcome continuous losses.
6 Within a planning 6 Suicide strategies are defined below. 5 horizon (3 or 5 years) suicide bids are resorted to in either the second or the fourth stage of the game.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the model as a stage game involving 2 states. Section III describes the theorems or results developed in this paper in a heuristic manner. We present certain general theorems for 3 stage games and describe all the possible Nash Equilibrium profiles. We also describe at length an outcome that we term as 'suicide strategies'. Suicide strategies constitute a way for a loser to win at any cost and bear resemblance to some aspects of economic liberalization. Section IV provides detailed proofs of the theorems. Section V examines the impact of unequal reputation functions on the Nash Equilibrium profiles and Section VI concludes.
II. The Model
To keep the model within tractable limits, we consider two states, P 1 and P 2 competing for a homogenous sequence of firms. The basic characteristics of the model are as follows. WE now discuss some aspects of this model.
i) The function c :
The implementation of a tax or subsidy differential by governments has both a current and future impact, the sum of which is assumed to be positive. We use a positive valued monotonic increasing (reputation) function c to capture this effect. It can be thought of as the positive impact on the policymakers (loosely thought to comprise of bureaucrats and politicians) in terms of their continuance as policymakers consequent upon their ability to create enhanced "business climate". ii) The tie-breaking rule:
When bids are equal it is reasonable to assign the win to any of the players with equal probability assuming there are no exogenous factors to favor any particular player. In the first stage of the game, the firm has already evaluated the bidding states as being equal in status and chooses the highest bidder. In case of a tie, the decision to locate in any particular state is assumed to be outside the purview of the game or equivalently each state has an equal chance of winning. In the subsequent stages, incoming firms look for any factors that will help them decide their choice, in case of a tie. We have modeled this by the rule "the winner at a history wins again in case of a tie". This appears to reflect the reality sufficiently closely; especially in states or cities or regions in an emerging economy which compete to attract firms from outside the country to locate and invest in their areas. Those states, which have a better record of having attracted foreign business, will have a starting advantage at any stage of the game.
iii) Discreteness of Choice:
The set S of strategies in our case is a finite set. In the literature on tax competition or competitive subsidies offered by firms (equivalent to a negative tax), the problem is usually modeled as a game where the set of choices or strategies is a continuum
(where x is the maximum pre-agreed bid) or ) , 0 [
. There are two points to note here.
If we model economic variables as belonging to a closed or open subset of the reals, we effectively smoothen out the small jumps in the value of the functions and can use 9 the methods of calculus of variations or maximum principle. Very often there are crucial and important differences between a discrete model vis-à-vis a continuous model for the same problem. 8 In the case of bidding for a firm it quickly transpires that there is a notable difference in the possible equilibrium strategies. For, in the case of a continuum x , 0 of strategies, it is clear that each competing state can infinitesimally increase its subsidy offer and defeat its competitor, thereby pushing the bid as high as possible. The effect of this is that both will offer the maximum possible -equal to the states' valuation of the total worth of gaining the firm-exactly like the classical bidding game.
In this paper, the set S of strategies is finite. The game is modelled in such a way that the set of choices or strategies is a continuum x , 0 , where, x is the maximum bid (or, , 0 ). Consequently the problem is reduced to one of finding bids under constraints of welfare maximization, or revenue and tax maximisation. In this paper, the constraints are the utility (political gains) of attracting investments against the cost or subsidies that can be associated with the process of attracting these investments. The extant literature examines the problem as one of optimization; the current paper consequently addresses the same problem as a finite stage game with a finite set of strategies.
III. Statement of theorems and results:
We assume that the set of strategies, has only two elements, 0 and x. We start with conditions under which a given profile can be a N.E. profile in a three stage game, and describe all the possible N.E final histories.
Theorem 1
8 One such example is the logistic curve as against the logistic equation.
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In order that (s 1 ,s 2 ) should be a N.E. profile, the following are necessary.
(i) The first stage bids are equal, i.e. (ii) Let h be any history after the first stage and let w i (h) denote the number of times P i has won in h. Then s 1 (h)=x if w 1 (h) < w 2 (h) and s 2 (h)=x if w 2 (h) < w 1 (h).
(iii) The third stage bids are equal i.e. b) (0,0,1); (x,x,1); (x,x,1), and, 
Theorem 2
In the three stage game, i)
The strategy profile 
Theorem 3a
Let both players bid x in the first stage, and follow the strategy described in Theorem 3
for the second and third stages. such that either state may win with equal probability. In the second stage P 2 will bid x and P 1 will bid 0 at the outcome 1 , 0 , 0 and the reverse at the outcome 2 , 0 , 0 . Thus at the end of the second stage P 1 and P 2 will have a win each in all cases and consequently will bid 0 at the third stage.
The question that naturally arises is whether this profile will give a better payoff to either player than the ones discussed in Theorem 2. The answer is yes. For instance, the payoff for the strategy in Theorem 3 is 2 1 2 x which is greater than the payoff the strategy in Theorem 2(ii), which is x/2. The condition, under which the profile is an equilibrium profile, is much stronger than for those in theorem 2. The smaller the , the lower are the chances that this will be true, if states value their reputation at not too low a level. Another reason why this may be expected is because the first stage winner can always continue to win by matching the bid of the competitor. The incentive to deliberately lose in the second stage arises from the expectation of winning at the 3 rd stage and earning a higher payoff. This cannot happen if the discount rate is too small. Winning at a later (third) stage will yield only a small current value with a probability ½, and will not offset the loss in reputation in the second stage given that 0 c and x c are not correspondingly very small.
The strategy (s 1 , s 2 ) in theorem 2 yields the striking conclusion that if P 1 wins in the first stage then P 1 will continue to win in all the subsequent stages. At the end of the third stage P 1 will have a positive payoff whereas P 2 will have a net negative pay off. A way to remedy this situation will be for the loser in the first stage to take the lead and make a bid at the second stage that cannot be matched by its competitor, i.e., it should bid beyond x and hope its competitor will not follow suit.
Let us suppose that the set of strategies for each player is now
The payoff function is the same as before. For example if P 1 bids x and P 2 bids 2x, then P 1 loses and receives a payoff of x c x x c 2 while P 2 wins and receives a payoff of
At first sight this looks like a very unattractive choice for P 2 . However, it has the effect of balancing out the winning history at any stage. In fact we prove the following. Let T be the 3-stage game with the following rules. There are two players P 1 and P 2 each s takes the value x if P 1 has won twice and takes the value 2x if P 2 has won twice, and is 0 if P 1 and P 2 each have won once. The value 2x is not important. We have chosen 2x since we assume that bids are to be multiples of x.
10 One can understand this inequality as follows. States decide to play the suicide strategy only if in their calculation any loser at the first stage can gain by it. For instance, suppose both play 0 at the first stage. Then either player has an equal likelihood of losing a n d f a c e s f u r t h e r l o s s e s i n t h e 2 nd a n d t h e 3 rd stages. In such a contingency the loser faces a cumulative loss of 
IV. Proofs of Theorems
Proof of Theorem 1.
We first take up (iii). . This proves (ii).
Proof of (iii)
Proof of (i)
Suppose on the contrary x s . It turns out that p 1 (t 1 ,t 2 ) is strictly greater than p 1 (t 1 ,t 2 ). If on the other
, w e a l l o w P 2 t o d e v i a t e f r o m s 2 by playing t 2 where x t t t . It is easily checked that p 1 (s 1 ,t 2 ) > p 2 (s 1 ,s 2 ).
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Proof of (iv)
As a consequence of (i), (ii) and (iii), it is easy to see that the possible N.E. final histories are, (a), (b), (c), (d) and also (c') (which is the same as (c) except that the third stage bid pair is x x, ) and d' (which is the same as d except that the third stage bid pair is x x, ). We can show that neither (c') nor (d') can be N.E. final history. For instance, consider (c'). The final history is,
Consider the payoff of P 1 . It is 2 1 x p . We can find an alternative strategy for P 1 which will yield a higher payoff. The deviation is that P 1 continues with the first stag bid as before. But bids x at all subsequent histories. Then, the final history (since P 2 continues with the original strategy) is,
The payoff of P 1 is
Hence (c') cannot be a N.E. final history. Similarly (d') cannot be a N.E. final history.
These outcomes are shown in Figure 4 . This completes the proof of (ii), since necessity of the condition follows from the working in (c).
The proof of (i) This is shown in the extensive form in figure 5.
Figure 5 here
All Nash equilibria that result as an outcome of competition between states with unequal political or economic infrastructure will be inefficient. These conclusions have important implications for federal policy. An across the board liberalization policy allowing states with different political and welfare perceptions to bid freely for attracting business, will hurt the better placed states. "One bad egg will make the whole basket go bad".
VI. Conclusions
The extant analysis of bidding for FDI in federal countries has ignored diversity in the economic conditions of states or at least considered it relatively less important. This paper relaxes this assumption by differentiating among states according to their reputation. It also emphasizes the intertemporal impacts that such diversity can have through reputational effects.
In this paper we develop a substantial generalization of the extant literature on bidding for attracting investment by states in a federal framework by constructing a model of a game (among diverse players) which focuses on the role of "reputation factors" in the design of these bidding processes. This permits us to advance several robust conclusions about the bidding process.
First, we show that the magnitude of the discount factor and the reputation effect have impacts on the possible Nash Equilibrium. Second, we clarify the role that multi-stage bidding has in the outcome of competition for investment funds in a federal framework.
We have shown that states can actually bid at some stages and achieve a more efficient equilibrium outcome. Hence, the intertemporal aspect of the game is critical, an issue largely ignored in the extant literature. This paper has thus emphasized the role that time and diversity across states can play in designing FDI policy. Indeed, the admission of these factors could lead to considerably worse outcomes than those admitted in the extant literature and, at the very least, underscores the importance of national coordination of FDI policy in federal states. 
